Proof of Retrievability (POR) is a protocol by which a client can distribute his/her data to cloud servers and can check if the data stored in the servers is available and intact. After that, network codingbased POR has been applied to improve network throughput. Although many network coding-based PORs have been proposed, most of them have not achieved the following practical features: direct repair and dynamic operations. In this paper, we propose the D2-POR scheme (Direct repair and Dynamic operations in network coding-based POR) to address these shortcomings. When a server is corrupted, the D2-POR can support the direct repair in which the data stored in the corrupted server can be repaired using the data directly provided by healthy servers. The client is thus free from the burden of data repair. Furthermore, the D2-POR allows the client to efficiently perform dynamic operations, i.e., modification, insertion and deletion. key words: Proof of Retrievability, network coding, direct repair, dynamic operations
Introduction
Since amount of data is increasing exponentially, data storage and data management become burdensome tasks of the client. Therefore, storage providers called clouds have been proposed to allow the client to store, manage and share the data portably and easily from anywhere via the Internet. However, because cloud providers could not be trustworthy, this system introduces three security challenges: data availability, data integrity and data confidentiality. Ensuring data availability and data integrity is the primary requirement before ensuring data confidentiality because data availability and data integrity are the prerequisites of the existence of a system. This paper thus focuses on data availability and data integrity. To support the client to check whether the data stored in the servers is available and intact, researchers proposed Proof of Retrievability (POR) [1] - [3] , which is a challenge-response protocol between a client and a server. Based on the POR, the following three approaches are commonly used: replication, erasure coding, and network coding. In the replication [4] - [6] , the client stores a file replica in each server. The client can perform periodic server checks. If a server is corrupted, the client will use * The preliminary version of this paper was presented at CO-COON'15 [28] . This study is partly supported by Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (25730083).
a) E-mail: tpthao@jaist.ac.jp DOI: 10.1587/transinf.2015ICP0014 a healthy replica to repair the corruption. The drawback of this approach is the high storage cost for the redundant replicas. To address this drawback, erasure coding has been applied in [7] - [10] . Instead of storing file replicas as replication, the client stores file blocks in each server. Hence, the storage cost can be reduced. However, the drawback of this approach is that to repair a corrupted server, the client must reconstruct the original file before generating new coded blocks. The computation cost is thus increased during data repair. To address this drawback, network coding has been applied in [11] - [13] in which the client does not need to reconstruct the original file before repairing the corruption. Instead, the client can retrieve coded blocks from healthy servers to generate new coded blocks. Therefore, this paper focuses on network coding. In addition, the data stored in the servers cannot be checked without additional information, i.e., Message Authentication Code (MAC tag) (used in a symmetric key setting) or signature (used in an asymmetric key setting). Because it is well-known that a symmetric key setting is more efficient than an asymmetric key setting, we thus focus on MAC tags. Concretely, to be suitable for network coding, we use homomorphic MACs in our scheme [14] - [16] .
to the new server. Such a repair mechanism is a troublesome task for the client. Because the data repair is performed very often during the system lifetime, the client thus incurs high computation and communication costs. Secondly, the schemes do not consider dynamic operations. That is, the client can only perform data check and data retrieval, but cannot perform modification, insertion and deletion. A few PORs were proposed to deal with the dynamic operations, e.g, [21] - [24] ; however, all these schemes are based on erasure coding, not network coding. There are two notable schemes which are mostly related to our proposed scheme. The first one is the MD-POR [25] , which can support the direct repair, but cannot support the dynamic operations. The second one is the NCAudit [26] , which also considered the direct repair and dynamic operations. However, when the direct repair is supported, this scheme cannot prevent pollution attack which is a common attack of network coding. This is because the new server cannot check the provided coded blocks. Furthermore, the dynamic operations have not been completed and have not been discussed with clear details. For the insertion, the authors said that the insertion does not work in their scheme. For the modification, the authors discuss how to update tags without showing how to update coded blocks. For the deletion, there is no concrete explanation.
Contribution.
In this paper, we propose the D2-POR scheme with the following contributions:
• Direct repair: when a server is corrupted, the healthy servers will provide their coded blocks and tags directly to the new server without sending them back to the client. Then, the new server can check them to prevent pollution attack, and can compute new coded blocks and tags for itself. The client is thus free from the repair process.
• Dynamic operations: the client not only can check and retrieve the data, but also can modify, insert and delete the data.
• Symmetric key setting: our scheme does not use any public key for the efficiency. The direct repair feature introduces a challenge that how to allow the new server which is untrusted to check and compute new coded blocks and tags without using a public key. Our scheme can address this problem by using an orthogonal key technique called InterMac [27] .
Roadmap. The backgrounds of the POR, network coding and InterMac are described in Sect. 2. The adversarial model is presented in Sect. 3. The D2-POR scheme is proposed in Sect. 4. The security and efficiency analyses are shown in Sects. 5 and 6. A numeric example is given in Sect. 7. The conclusion is drawn in Sect. 8.
Background

The POR Framework
The POR [1] - [3] is a challenge-response protocol between a verifier V (client) and a prover P (server), and consists of the following algorithms:
• Keygen(λ) → κ: run by V. This algorithm inputs a security parameter s and outputs a secret key κ (For an asymmetric key system, κ is a public/private key pair.) • Encode(F, κ) → F : run by V. This algorithm inputs an original file F and κ, and outputs an encoded file F * , and then sends F * to P.
• Check() → {accept/deny}: run by both V and P.
Firstly, V generates a challenge c and sends c to P. P then computes a response r and sends r back to V. V finally verifies P based on c and r.
• Repair(): run by V. When a corruption is detected, V executes this algorithm to repair the corruption. The technique of repair depends on each specific scheme, i.e, replication, erasure coding or network coding.
Network Coding in Distributed Storage System
Network coding [11] - [13] has been proposed for costefficiency in data transmission and data repair. The model system consists of a client and multiple servers. The client owns a file F and wants to redundantly store coded blocks in the servers in a way that the client can reconstruct F and can repair coded blocks in a corrupted server. The client firstly divides F into m blocks:
where k ∈ {1, · · · , m}. F z q denotes a z-dimensional finite field of a prime order q. The client then augments v k with a vector of length m which contains a '1' bit in the k-th position and (m − 1) '0' bits elsewhere. The resulting block is called augmented block (denoted by w k ). w k has the following form:
Thereafter, the client randomly chooses m coefficients α 1 , · · · , α m in F q to compute coded blocks using the lin- Note that the matrix consisting of the coefficients used to construct any m coded blocks should have full rank. Koetter et al. [13] proved that if the prime q is chosen large enough and the coefficients are chosen randomly, the probability for the matrix to have full rank is high. When a server is corrupted, the client repairs it by retrieving the coded blocks Fig. 1 The client stores the coded blocks in the server S 1 , S 2 , S 3 . Suppose that S 1 is corrupted, the client repair it by the linear combinations of the coded blocks from S 2 and S 3 .
from healthy servers and linearly combining them to regenerate new coded blocks. An example of the data repair is given in Fig. 1 .
InterMac
In our scheme, the direct repair yields a challenge that how to allow the new server which is untrusted to check the provided coded blocks without learning the secret key of the client. The InterMac [27] is a suitable technique to generate such a key for the new server. Basically, the InterMac is proposed to generate a vector which is orthogonal to a given set of vectors. Formally, given a set of vectors {w 1 , · · · , w m }, the algorithm outputs a vector k p such that w k · k p = 0, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · , m}.
1. The InterMac algorithm is described as follows:
• Find the span π of w 1 , · · · , w m ∈ F •
2. The sub-algorithm Kg used in the InterMac algorithm is given as follows: 
Adversarial Model
In our scheme, the client is trusted and the servers are untrusted. Assume that the servers do not collude with each other. The servers can perform two types of attacks:
1. In the check phase: the servers disrupts the system or modifies the data. The attacks can be commonly prevented by the tags, we thus do not focus on them.
2. In the repair phase: the servers can perform: (i) pollution attack which is a common attack of network coding, and (ii) curious attack which is a special attack of the direct repair. We focus on them in the security analysis.
• • Curious Attack. This attack is performed by the new server in the repair phase. Every repair time, the new server is given a key k r constructed from the secret key k C of the client and a variant k p . Having k r , the new server tries to obtain k C in order to pass the check phases in the later time step (called epoch).
Proposed D2-POR Scheme
Notations
The notations used throughout the D2-POR scheme are given in Table 1 .
Construction
Setup
(1) Create augmented blocks:
where k ∈ {1, · · · , m}. C creates m augmented blocks as Eq. (1). 
number of healthy servers used for data repair S r corrupted server S r new server which is used to replace S r F z q z-dimensional finite field F of a prime order q (2) Keygen: C generates two types of keys:
• Key of the client (
• One-time key for a new server every repair time (k r ):
k C is static, only k p is recomputed every repair time. k r is sent to the new server only when a data repair is executed.
Encode
(1) C computes a tag for each augmented block: For ∀k ∈ {1, · · · , m}:
(2) C computes nd coded blocks and nd corresponding tags as follows:
• C computes code blocks:
• C compute tags:
(3) C sends {c i j , t i j } where j ∈ {1, · · · , d} to server S i .
Check
(1) C requires S i to provide its proof.
(2) S i where i ∈ {1, · · · , n} combines coded blocks and tags as follows:
• S i combines coded blocks:
• S i combines tags:
• C computes:
• C checks iff:
If it holds, S i is healthy. Otherwise, S i is corrupted.
Repair
Suppose S r is corrupted. A set of l healthy servers
to provide data to a new server S r , which is used to replace S r .
(1) S i where i ∈ {i 1 , · · · , i l } provides its data to S r as follows:
• S r computes:
• S r checks iff:
(3) S r computes d new coded blocks and d tags:
• S r computes new coded block:
• S r computes new tag:
4.3 Correctness
(1) The correctness of Eq. (9) is proved as follows:
The correctness of Eq. (13) is proved as follows:
Dynamic Operations
When C performs a dynamic operation on a file block, herein introduces a challenge: how the servers deal with the coded blocks which are related to the modified/ inserted/deleted file block. The trivial solution, which is to encode the data again, incurs very high costs. In our solution, the old coded blocks and tags stored in the servers can be re-used, and only a small additional computation is needed for the dynamic operations.
Firstly, we give the following theorem, which will form the basis of the dynamic operations. 
Because each augmented block w k ∈ F z+m q (where k ∈ {1, · · · , m}) consists of v k ∈ F z q and m elements in F q , the dimension of M is m × (z + m). Thus, the number of pivot variables is m. The number free variables is (z + m) − m = z. Therefore, the number of basis vectors of M is z.
Modification
Suppose that C modifies a file block v X to a new file block v X where X ∈ {1, · · · , m}. Let w X and w X be the augmented block of v X and v X , respectively.
(1) C modifies k r :
Let M be the matrix consisting of m augmented blocks. After the modification, only v X is changed and other elements in M are unchanged. Namely, M is changed to M as follows:
The modification does not affect k C because k C rand ← F z+m q . However, the modification will affect k r (= k C + k p ) because k p is constructed from M. This is why we need to update k r .
The number of columns in M is (z + m). The number of basis vectors of M is z (Theorem 2). Thus, each of these z basis vectors consists of (z + m) elements in F q , denoted by
T where ψ ∈ {1, · · · , z}. Similarly, each of the z basis vectors of M also consists of (z + m)
T where ψ ∈ {1, · · · , z}. We need to find B ψ from B ψ .
Because v X ∈ F z q , v X is viewed as a vector of z elements in F q : v X = (v X1 , · · · , v Xz ). In M, only v X is changed and other elements are unchanged. Thus, for each ψ ∈ {1, · · · , z}, C only needs to update the (z + X)-th element of B ψ by computing ((− z μ=1 v Xμ b μ ) mod q). Namely: . 2.3) . C finally sends k r = k C + k p to a new server when a next repair phase is executed.
(2) C computes tag for w k :
(3) S i updates coded blocks and tags:
has the form: 
. . .
For ∀ j ∈ {1, · · · , d}, S i computes new coded blocks:
For ∀ j ∈ {1, · · · , d}, S i computes new tags:
where c i j and t i j are old coded blocks and tags. Coefficient 
Insertion
Suppose that C inserts a file block v I after an existing file block v X where X ∈ {1, · · · , m}. Let w I be the augmented block of v I .
(1) C modifies k C :
Before the insertion, w k has (z + m) elements in F q as Eq. (18) . Thus,
T ). After the insertion, w k has (z + m + 1) elements in F q :
. Given k C , we find k C : • The first (z + X) elements of k C are the same as the first (z + X) elements of k C .
• The (z + X + 1)-th element of k C (denoted by k I ) is computed as: k I rand ← F q .
• The last (m − X) elements of k C are the same as the last (m − X) elements of k C . Namely:
The reason that we construct such k C will be explained in Step 4 (tag update).
(2) C modifies k r :
After the insertion, the matrix M is changed as follows:
• In each of the first X rows: a '0' bit is padded in the final position.
• In the inserted row (w I ): v I is placed in the first z elements, a '1' bit is placed at the (z + X + 1)-th element counted from the left, and '0' bits are placed elsewhere.
• In each of the last (m − X) rows: a '0' bit is padded in the final position and then, the '1' bit is shipped to the next right position. 
We now update k r as follows. Let
T where ψ ∈ {1, · · · , z} be the z basis vectors of M and M , respectively. Given B ψ , we firstly find
• The first (z + X) elements of B ψ are the same as the first (z + X) elements of B ψ .
• The (z + X + 1)-th elements of B ψ is computed as:
• The last (m − X) elements of B ψ are the same as the last (m − X) elements of B ψ . In other words:
After having B ψ for all ψ ∈ {1, · · · , z}, C computes k p ← Kg(B 1 , · · · , B z ). C finally sends k r = k C + k p to a new server when next repair phase is executed.
(3) C computes tag for w I :
• C computes t I = w I · k C .
• C sends {w I , t I } to S i . ((4).1) S i updates its coded blocks:
(4) S i updates coded blocks and tags:
where α i jI rand ← F q .
((4).2) S i updates its tags:
Tags of augmented blocks before the insertion are:
Step 1, tags of augmented blocks after the insertion are:
We can observe that before and after the insertion, the first X tags and the last (m − X) tags are unchanged. Only the new tag t I (tag of w I ) is inserted. The old tag of c i j is computed as t i j = m k=1 α i jk t w k . Thus, we compute the tag for c i j as follows:
where α i jI is the same as in Eq. (24) .
The insertion only needs O(1) for modifying k C , O(z) for modifying k r , O(1) for computing tag for w I and O(z) for updating a coded block and a tag.
Deletion
Suppose that C deletes the X-th file block (v X ). Let w X be the augmented block of v X .
(1) C modifies k C : Similar to the insertion, before the deletion,
T . After the deletion, C simply removes the (z + X)-th element in k C . Namely,
The reason to construct such k C will be explained in Step 3 (tag update).
After the deletion, the matrix M is changed as follows:
• In each of the first (X − 1) rows, the '0' bit at the final position is removed.
• The X-th row is removed.
• In each of the last (m − X) rows, the '1' bit is shipped to the previous left position and then, the '0' bit at the final position is removed.
T where ψ ∈ {1, · · · , z} be the z basis vectors of M and M , respectively. To compute B ψ from B ψ , C simply removes the (z + X)-th element of B ψ . Namely,
After having B ψ for all ψ ∈ {1, · · · , z}, C computes k p as: ((3).1) S i updates its coded blocks:
where
((3).2) S i updates its tags:
Tags of augmented blocks before the deletion are:
By constructing k C as Step 1, tags of augmented blocks after the deletion are:
We observe that before and after the deletion, only X-th tag is removed and the other tags are unchanged. The old tag of c i j is computed as: t i j = m k=1 α i jk t w k . Thus, we compute the tag for c i j as follows:
where α i jX is the same as in Eq. (28) .
The deletion only needs O(1) for modifying k C , O(z) for modifying k r , O(z) for updating a coded block and tag.
Security Analysis
Our scheme is secure from pollution attack and curious attack as follows.
Theorem 3:
The D2-POR is secured from the pollution and curious attacks.
Proof:
1. Pollution attack: suppose that A is a malicious server in a set of l servers used in data repair. A injects an invalid pair of (c A , t A ) to the new server S r . S r will check (c A , t A ) using the key k r ∈ F z+m q . Because S r is assumed to not collude with the other servers, k r is only known by S r . Thus, A can only pass the verification of S r with a probability 1/q z+m via the brute-force search. If q is chosen large enough (e.g, 160 bits), the probability is 1/(2 160 ) z+m , which is negligible.
Consider that S r itself is a malicious server who will perform a pollution attack in the next epoch. Even though S r holds k r , S r cannot pass the verification because k r is a one-time repair key. Another new server will be given a key k r k r .
2. Curious attack: the new server is given the key k r = k C + k p ∈ F z+m q . Similar to the pollution attack, the probability of the new server to learn k C is 1/q z+m via the brute-force search. This probability is from learning k C directly or learning k p and then obtaining k C by k C = k r − k p . If q is chosen large enough (e.g, 160 bits), the probability is 1/(2 160 ) z+m , which is negligible.
We also show the condition to reconstruct F via the following theorem. . Therefore, to reconstruct F, m augmented blocks are viewed as the unknowns that need to be solved. To solve these unknowns, at least m coded blocks are required such that the accumulated coefficient matrix has full rank.
Let l be the number of servers (l < n) which collectively stores these m coded blocks. Because each server stores d coded blocks, l ≥ m d .
Efficiency Analysis
The feature and efficiency comparison between our scheme and previous schemes (RDC-NC, MD-POR and NC-Audit) is given in Table 2 . Because the MD-POR and NC-Audit schemes focus on the public authentication, the system models have one more entity called TPA (Third Party Auditor) who is delegated the task of checking the servers by C. For the fair comparison, we assume that the check task in these schemes is performed by C. Furthermore, the MD-POR deals with multiple clients. Thus, for fair comparison, we set the number of clients in MD-POR is one. 
Storage Cost
Client-side. In the RDC-NC, C stores 5 keys in F z+m q . Thus, the storage cost is 5(z + m) log 2 q. In the NC-Audit, C stores a key in F z+m q and mnd coefficients in F q . Thus, the storage cost is (z + m + mnd) log 2 q. In the MD-POR and D2-POR, C stores a key in F z+m q . Thus, the storage cost is (z + m) log 2 q. Server-side. In all the schemes, there are n server. Each server stores d coded blocks. Each coded block belongs to F z+m q . Thus, the storage cost is O(dn(z + m) log 2 q).
Computation Cost
Encode. In all the schemes, C needs O(m) to compute m tags for m augmented blocks, and O(mnd) to compute nd coded blocks along with the tags. The complexity on the clientside is thus O(mnd). Meanwhile, the servers only need to receive the coded blocks and tags from C without any computation. The complexity on the server-side is thus O (1) .
Check. In all the schemes, C needs O(1) to verify the aggregated coded block and tag of each server. Therefore, the complexity on the client-side is O(n) to verify n servers. Meanwhile, each server needs to combine d coded blocks and d tags to compute the aggregated coded block and aggregated tag, respectively. Therefore, the complexity of n servers is O(dn).
Repair. In the RDC-NC scheme, C needs O(l) to check l pairs of the provided coded block and tag from the healthy servers, and needs O(dl) to compute d pairs of new coded blocks and tags using the linear combinations of l pairs of the provided coded blocks and tags. Therefore, the complexity on the client-side is O(dl). In the MD-POR, NCAudit and D2-POR schemes, the complexity on the clientside is O(1) because C does not need to do anything due to the direct repair.
In the RDC-NC scheme, each of l servers combines its d coded blocks and d tags to compute the aggregated coded block and aggregated tag, respectively. Therefore, the complexity on the server-side is O(dl). In the MD-POR, NCAudit and D2-POR schemes, l healthy servers perform as in the RDC-NC (O(dl)), and the new server performs the task of C as in the RDC-NC (O(dl)). Therefore, the complexity on the server-side is O(dl).
Modification. In the D2-POR, C only needs O(z) to recompute k r (Step 1) and O(1) to compute new tag for the modified augmented block (Step 2). Therefore, the complexity on client-side is O(z). Meanwhile, each server needs O(dz) to update coded blocks and tags (Step 3). Therefore, the complexity of n servers is O(dnz).
Insertion. In the D2-POR, C only needs O(1) to recompute k C (Step 1), O(z) to recompute k r ( Step 2) and O(1) to compute tag of the inserted augmented block (Step 3). Therefore, the complexity on client-side is O(z). Meanwhile each server needs O(dz) to update coded blocks and tags (Step 4). Therefore, the complexity of n servers is O(dnz).
Deletion. In the D2-POR, C only needs O(1) to recompute k C (Step 1) and O(z) to recompute k r (Step 2). Thus, the complexity on client-side is O(z). Meanwhile, each server needs O(dz) to update the coded blocks and tags (Step 3). Thus, the complexity of n servers is O(dnz).
Communication
Encode. In all the schemes, C computes dn coded blocks and sends d coded blocks to each of n servers. The size of a coded block is ((z + m) log 2 q). Thus, the communication cost is O(dn(z + m) log 2 q).
Check. In all the schemes, during the check phase, each of n servers sends its aggregated coded block and its aggregated tag to C. The size of a coded block and a tag is ((z+m) log 2 q) and log 2 q, respectively. Thus, the communication cost is O(n(z + m + 1) log 2 q).
Repair. In the RDC-NC, each of l healthy servers sends to C an aggregated coded block whose size is ((z + m) log 2 q) and an aggregated tag whose size is log 2 q (it takes O(l(z + m + 1) log 2 q)). Modify. In the D2-POR, C sends the updated k r ∈ F z+m q to new server in Step 1 (O((z + m) log 2 q)), and send (w X ∈ F z+m q , t X ∈ F q ) to each S i where i ∈ {1, · · · , n} in Step 2 (O(n(z + m + 1) log 2 q)). Thus, the communication cost is O((z + m) log 2 q + n(z + m + 1) log 2 q) = O(((n + 1)(z + m) + n) log 2 q).
Insert. In the D2-POR, C sends the updated k r ∈ F • Generate randomly r = 2 ∈ F 7 .
• Recompute k p : 
